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Abstract 
This paper explores entrepreneurial strategy by analyzing the Internet video industry. 
Data on entrants to the Chinese Internet video industry from 2006–2011 reveal how those 
that adapt to shift in the environment outperform less flexible firms. The paper also 
shows how exaptive processes, including strategic commitment to user communities, 
increase resilience in start-ups that face such shifts. These findings introduce an expanded 
view of entrepreneurial strategy by directly linking strategic choice to venture 
performance and clarifying the role of exaptation in entrepreneurship. 
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1 Introduction 
In December 2006, YouKu.com officially went live. Together with similar firms, YouKu 
started as a clone of YouTube.com and sought to exploit China’s exclusion of YouTube 
(and other foreign Internet video firms). These clones shared a common technological 
base, so they competed by offering different business features toward the end of 
becoming the dominant Internet video-sharing firm in China. YouKu began as a pure 
user-generated content (UGC) firm whose sole offering was content uploaded by Chinese 
Internet users, and it enjoyed quick success as the overall Internet video market in China 
grew rapidly. However, the UGC business model was severely challenged following 
regulatory changes mandated by the Chinese government in 2008. YouKu, like many 
other firms in the industry, was forced to change. Yet unlike many of its peers, YouKu 
decided to retain the UGC part of its operations even as it switched to offer 
professionally produced content (PPC) – that is, content licensed from traditional media 
producers such as TV and movie studios – as its main offering. From this petri dish of 
entrepreneurial competition, YouKu and a handful of other firms eventually emerged as 
winners. On 10 December 2010, YouKu.com was listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange; it was the world’s first Internet video-sharing company with a successful 
initial public offering of stock (Hille, 2012). 
YouKu’s story is hardly unique; after all, the business world is replete with 
examples of firms that succeeded only after a series of adaptations. Conventional wisdom 
presumes that the emergence of a competitive advantage requires parallel developments 
of new and purposefully developed sets of capabilities or innovations that are tailored to a 
changing environment. Yet anecdotal evidence suggests that adaptation is not always 
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purposeful and that ex post successful features are often alternate uses of original 
functions. This process is known as exaptation, a concept borrowed from evolutionary 
biology. Exaptive features are typically produced by natural selection for a function other 
than the one it currently performs, which is then co-opted by the new function. In the 
management literature, the same term often refers to the exploitation of an existing body 
of knowledge so as to a gain a competitive advantage in an emerging industry (see e.g. 
Cattani, 2005, 2006; Dew, Sarasvathy, & Venkataraman, 2004; Mokyr, 2000). 
Building on this body of knowledge and extending it to the nascent literature on 
entrepreneurial strategy, our study documents how the most successful entrants in 
China’s Internet video industry emerged. Despite an exogenous regulatory change that 
ran counter to the original business model of some firms, their retention of key features in 
the model gave them performance benefits when they pivoted to a new business model. 
Our proposed explanation is confirmed by regressions in which entrants are matched by 
entry timing, ownership, and performance characteristics prior to the regulatory change. 
This evidence suggests that, in the Chinese Internet video industry, the most successful 
firms leveraged capabilities gained from exaptive processes as their business strategies 
evolved. 
This paper has three principal aims. First, it answers the call to identify 
appropriate methodological approaches for studying exaptation. Although formal 
modeling has been used to describe the dynamic of this phenomenon, researchers still 
face the challenge of devising ad hoc research strategies for documenting when and 
analyzing how exaptation occurs in real-world situations. Our presentation involves 
outlining a novel empirical approach to the systematic study of exaptive processes and 
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then demonstrating that approach through analysis of the Internet video industry in China, 
while leveraging an exogenous regulatory shock to address potential endogeneity related 
issues.  We propose that longitudinal large sample studies of similar nature as ours can 
provide the appropriate research design for studying exaptation. 
Second, in documenting that industry’s growth and trajectory, our paper gives the 
first systematic and large-scale evidence of exaptive processes in the evolution of a 
nascent industry and also provides novel evidence of user communities serving as 
complementary assets.  We demonstrate how early investment in building a user 
community plays a complementary but also “accidental” role in a website’s eventual 
switch to offering professional content. That finding has broad implications beyond the 
context of this study as researchers seek to understand the strategic role of user 
communities (West & O’mahony 2008; Bogers, Afuah & Bastian 2010; Boudreau 2010).  
Third, we aim to disentangle the roles of luck and foresight in shaping 
entrepreneurial performance. In documenting the emergence and growth of a nascent 
industry, we show how selection and adaptation processes as well as luck play key roles 
in determining the success of individual entrepreneurial firms. In so doing, we also 
provide evidence that exaptation does not occur only within the context of technology, 
but also more broadly at the complementary assets level.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates the intellectual and 
empirical bases of this research. Section 3 describes the empirical setting and our 
research approach, which includes a novel method for studying exaptation. After 
reviewing how the Chinese Internet video industry developed and advancing our 
propositions in Section 4, in Section 5 we present the main empirical analysis along with 
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key robustness checks. The paper concludes in Section 6 with further discussion of our 
main findings and of their broader strategic implications for entrepreneurs and 
researchers both. 
 
2 Theory and related literature 
 
2.1 Role of strategic adaptation and exaptation 
Much scholarship has concerned itself with the life cycle of an industry; measures of 
interest include (inter alia) the number of firms, the rates of entry and exit, and 
differences in performance and innovative activity. With regard to the entry of firms, 
evolutionary economics and strategy have been invoked in much of the literature that 
links the performance outcomes of entrants to their pre-entry resources and capabilities 
(Helfat & Lieberman 2002; Klepper 2002; Bayus & Agarwal 2007). Although this view 
helps us connect technological pre-determinants with the devising and execution of 
business models, it fails to account for industry dynamics and strategic shifts. 
Ignoring firm adaptation and change is a critical omission because in highly 
uncertain environments – which are typical for emergent or nascent industries – few 
firms know ex ante what will become the dominant technology or business model. There 
will always be some who argue that breakthrough businesses are characterized by a 
single type of strategy and a preferred model of business selection and execution should 
be followed whenever feasible. Even so, the vast majority of practitioners and academic 
researchers in strategy hold that a strategy should reflect and respond to the environment 
in which the firm or organization operates (see e.g. Marx, Gans & Hsu 2014). 
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The literature just cited has increased awareness of the role played by change in 
the development of firm strategy. However, the distinction between conscious adaptation 
and exaptation has been largely overlooked. One reason for this oversight is the 
predominance of neo-Darwinian perspectives in management thinking, which has 
focused on the development of new strategic functions to improve environmental 
fitness – a process that depends on the proactive aspect of adaptation (see e.g. O’Reilly 
& Tushman, 2008; Thompson, 2011). The literature on exaptive processes is much 
smaller but has become increasingly influential. One line of inquiry in the innovation 
literature focuses on the interaction between exaptive and adaptive processes.  Bonifati 
(Bonifati, 2013) argues that exaptation may lead to “degeneracy”, a property whereby 
structurally different elements provide overlapping functionalities and thus (as with 
adaptive processes) result in firms developing new functionalities. This theme is 
repeated in Lane (2011), who develops an adaptive–exaptive model of innovation (called 
“exaptive bootstrapping”) that is based on technology adoption and incorporates not only 
technological but also organizational and societal considerations.  Even more broadly, 
Dew et. al. (Dew et al., 2004) noted how exaptation serves as a missing but central 
concept linking the evolution of technology with the entrepreneurial creation of new 
markets and the concept of Knightian uncertainty. 
Another line of literature seeks to link a firm’s exaptive processes directly to its 
competitive advantage. In a series of papers, Cattani (2005, 2006) instructively 
demonstrates how Corning’s supremacy in the fiber optic industry is due to capabilities it 
developed prior to the emergence of that industry. The author shows that Corning’s 
success results at least in part from their foresight in developing capabilities that they 
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could “recycle” even as they expanded into new domains. Together with Dew et. al. 
(Dew et al., 2004), Cattani’s work remains the main empirical bulwark upon which this 
burgeoning literature has rested, although larger-scale empirical work has been slow 
to follow. 
Clearly, this broad exaptive mechanism – of a firm developing capabilities which 
are repurposed – should be an important one for scholars and practitioners alike, and we 
argue that the mechanism is one in which entrepreneurs should be especially interested. 
Volatile industrial settings coupled with resource shortages require entrepreneurs to stay 
nimble and experiment.  In fact, scholars have characterized entrepreneurship as the act 
of performing “economic experiments” (Rosenberg, 1992). This theme is echoed in the 
broader stream of practitioner literature, which emphasizes the importance to 
entrepreneurial firms of conducting strategic experiments and so developing capabilities 
that can be leveraged in the future (McGrath, MacMillan, & Venkataraman, 1995).  
When one considers also how uncertain is the entrepreneurial process (e.g., the true value 
of a particular idea is most likely unknown to the entrepreneur), exaptive mechanisms are 
no less important than conscious adaptive mechanisms. 
Yet there have been few studies examining the relation between an 
entrepreneurial firm’s capabilities and strategic change, and what limited research can be 
found is mainly of a theoretical nature. Greater clarity is needed concerning the origins of 
an entrepreneurial firm’s competitive advantage, since the role of strategy is fundamental 
to our understanding of the entrepreneurial process. The concept of exaptation can 
actually be extended to bridge the gap between advocates of “selection” versus 
“adaptation” while clarifying the roles of luck and strategy in the evolution of nascent 
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industries. It could well be that the most successful firms are those that developed key 
capabilities before changing business models – even though the current applications of 
those capabilities were previously unknown. 
Our field work serves as the basis for distinguishing the roles that luck and 
strategy play in entrepreneurship, and we also borrow and extend Cattani’s (2006) 
original conception of pre-adaptation: the part of a firm’s knowledge base that is 
accumulated without anticipation (foresight) of all its possible subsequent uses, as when 
it later proves valuable for new (but previously unknown) applications. We argue that 
entrepreneurial firms can be endowed by their past history with knowledge for reasons 
unrelated to the application of that knowledge in a new setting or opportunity. In so 
doing, we demonstrate that the exaptation concept can help resolve the debate over the 
precise role of strategy in entrepreneurship. Extending Cattani’s claims about the role of 
technological pre-adaptation, we similarly argue that it is exactly when entrepreneurs are 
least certain about the environment that they are most in need of developed capabilities 
that can be repurposed. 
That being said, the precise effects of luck, foresight, and strategic change on 
entrepreneurial strategy are not easy to estimate. The paucity of empirical studies may be 
explained by the difficulty of observing a nascent industry from its inception while 
accounting fully for the contemporaneous strategic choices of entrants as well as the 
ultimate outcomes. Furthermore, one would want to accommodate the potential 
endogeneity of strategic decisions by way of some exogenous source of variation 
associated with a subset of firms that change their business model or strategy. Finally, the 
ideal empirical design for studies of this nature should also establish that the focal firms 
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are pursuing a common entrepreneurial opportunity; otherwise, there may be concerns 
that the sampled firms are not well identified. In the next section, we describe our 
approach to assembling a data set in which the consequences of both adaptive and 
exaptive processes can be reliably assessed. 
 
3 Empirical setting and data 
 
3.1 The Chinese Internet video industry 
Although existing studies (see e.g. Gans & Stern, 2003; Hsu, 2006) have contributed 
much to our understanding of entrepreneurial strategy, they seldom account for potential 
differences in the opportunities being exploited by entrepreneurs and so have difficulty 
isolating the effect of strategic choices. The problem is that variation among firms 
pursuing the focal entrepreneurial opportunity may bias results owing to systematic 
correlation with explanatory variables. These studies have typically sought to overcome 
such bias, which arises from unobserved heterogeneity, by using industry- and firm-level 
controls. That approach can be effective in settings where firms are easily distinguished 
by such observable characteristics as products and use of resources. However, control 
variables are of limited value when studying entrepreneurial companies in emergent 
industries because usually such firms neither fit well into prevailing industry categories 
nor possess easily observable characteristics. 
The fundamental empirical challenge is therefore an identification problem: we 
risk conflating the marginal effect of the firm’s strategic choice with the selection effect 
of the underlying entrepreneurial opportunity. Therefore, a simple comparison between 
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different strategic choices could lead to biased results because of unobserved differences 
in the potential of various entrepreneurial opportunities. The ideal solution to this 
problem would be an empirical setting in which there are multiple new ventures 
exploiting the same entrepreneurial opportunity; moreover, one would want to follow the 
full population of entrants – starting with the industry’s inception – and to have detailed 
data on both strategic choices and ultimate outcomes. 
We most fortunately have access to just such a setting: the entrepreneurial 
development of China’s emerging Internet video industry. China practices an active 
policy of Internet censorship and so foreign websites are frequently blocked there,1 with 
video websites such as YouTube among the most frequently censored. The system blocks 
content by preventing – via firewalls and proxy servers – censored websites’ “Internet 
protocol” addresses from being routed through. China also diverts Internet traffic from 
particular sites by way of so-called DNS spoofing hacks. In addition to other online video 
websites (e.g., Dailymotion and Vimeo), YouTube has been completely blocked from the 
Chinese Internet space since early 2006. 
An unintended but extremely useful consequence of China’s tight Internet 
censorship is that it provided a fertile ground for the development of China’s domestic 
Internet video industry. Entrepreneurs exploited the exclusion of foreign Internet video 
firms from the Chinese market and copied the technological idea (which originated in the 
United States) of distributing videos over the Internet; the result was a deluge of strongly 
similar “clones” emerging in the Chinese Internet video industry. We leverage this unique 
entrepreneurial development to identify precisely a set of firms that are exploiting a 
common entrepreneurial opportunity – namely, that of building China’s dominant 
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Internet video platform. 
In general, the phenomenon of Chinese clone companies, popularly referred to as 
“copy to China” (or “C2C” for short) has attracted increasing academic and popular 
attention.2 As the Internet industry continues to grow rapidly in China, many domestic 
companies have successfully exploited entrepreneurial ideas originally developed in 
foreign markets. Aided by the country’s rigorously enforced censorship policy, the 
Internet video sector is one of the most prominent beneficiaries of this C2C phenomenon. 
And because the original entrepreneurial opportunity originated in the United States, we 
are able to preclude “founder effects” from the analysis and so can directly assess the 
effects of strategic covariates. 
 
3.2 Empirical data 
This study is based on a newly assembled set of data on the Chinese Internet video 
industry; this data set covers that industry’s development from its inception (in about 
2006) through mid-2011. Working in conjunction with the major telecommunication 
providers in China, we developed a complete list of active Chinese online video websites. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the industry may have become active slightly earlier, 
but Chinese authorities did not start keeping tabs on it until 2006. We augmented the list 
after referring to various works in the practitioner and industry literatures (e.g., Gannes 
2009). Any video websites not on our final list are likely to be obscure or unregistered 
with the state, which in itself casts doubt on their legitimacy. 
We then collected the historical cached pages of each firm on our list using the 
Internet Wayback Machine, which is an initiative started by the Internet Archive (a 
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nonprofit organization based in California, USA) and maintained with content from 
Alexa Internet. This service enables users to see archived versions of Web pages across 
time. Together with research assistants, we coded each Web page individually by direct 
observation and categorization; for each website, we recorded data that delineate their 
specific bundles of content, activities, and resources. Because many of these firms 
underwent rapid changes in business models, we collected and analyzed data by each 
quarter of the year. Altogether, we recorded data for 19 quarters, from July 2006 to 
March 2011. 
The Internet Wayback Machine allows us to examine contemporaneous business 
model changes as well as the survival or failure of firms, but additional measures of 
interim performance are needed. We therefore obtained interim outcome variables from 
Baidu Index.  Baidu Index is analogous to Google Trends, and records interest and search 
volume for individual websites.  Google Trends data has been utilized successfully to 
measure performance for Internet based firms as it directly relates to online behavior (see 
e.g. Carrière-Swallow & Labbé, 2013; Luo, Zhang, & Duan, 2012).  We also supplement 
Baidu Index data with data from iResearch, a research consultant firm in China. The 
iResearch firm is a commercial media consultancy that has tracked Chinese website 
performance and Chinese Internet users’ behavior continuously since July 2006, when the 
service was launched. This consultancy performs functions similar to those of its US 
counterparts – most notably, ComScore.  Firm names were matched manually to the 
original list at a success rate of nearly 100%. In all, 146 firms are observed in our 
data set. 
 14 
We also collected qualitative data about how organizations responded to 
regulatory change and on how they made decisions concerning business models and 
strategy. Detailed schematics of the organization of video websites across the entire 
spectrum of content purveyors were reviewed with industry founders, insiders, and media 
analysts to ensure that we understood changes made in the business models. This 
background work enabled a careful determination of the nature of business model change 
and its effects on organizational performance. Semi-structured on-site field interviews 
with founders, investors, and media consultants in China were conducted in two waves 
over the period from April 2012 to July 2013. We conducted a total of 19 interviews, 
each of which lasted between one hour and an entire workday. Whenever possible, we 
crosschecked data with multiple sources. 
 
4 A qualitative review of development in the Chinese Internet video industry 
This section describes the dynamics of entrepreneurial competition in the Chinese 
Internet video industry as it unfolded over time. The first period (2006–2008) is one 
immediately after YouTube was introduced in the United States; the second period 
(2008–2011) was marked by radical regulatory change in China that invalidated the 
business model of some of this industry’s firms. We shall focus on examining the role (if 
any) played by exaptive processes in the success of firms under these circumstances. 
 
 
4.1 Contest of business models (2006–2008) 
Although the Internet video industry originated in the United States, developments in 
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China took place nearly in parallel. Entrants to the nascent Chinese industry grappled 
with developing the optimal business model as they sought to become the country’s 
dominant Internet video platform. In particular, there was a fierce contest between the 
UGC and PPC models (Artero 2010).3 As mentioned in the Introduction, firms operating 
under the user-generated content model rely on content sourced directly from users 
whereas those operating as a professionally produced content purveyor rely on content 
purchased from content providers (e.g., television and movie studios). In the United 
States, YouTube is the original UGC firm and Hulu exemplifies the PPC model. 
Although many Chinese sites began as pure clones of YouTube and thus offered 
only UGC, competing sites that focused on offering PPC emerged rapidly. Field 
interviews attest to the dichotomous nature of these two forms of content and to how they 
remain the dominant business models competing in this industry. A co-founder of a 
successful video site described their differences as follows: 
 
UGC and PPC are the two distinct forms of content … UGC is content sourced 
from users while PPC is content pushed to users. YouTube popularized UGC but 
PPC had rapidly emerged as another form … The state stations had been putting 
content on the Web for some time. Other private companies also started licensing 
material and putting [it] on the Web … for example, Korean drama serials and 
Taiwanese variety shows. 
 
Although the UGC and PPC business models are based on the same technological 
platform,4 they represent two distinct modes of firm operation. In particular, maintaining 
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a UGC site requires development of the specific capabilities required to support a viable 
user community. Thus UGC websites must develop infrastructure to enable the uploading 
and publishing of content by users while also providing incentives to encourage 
production and contribution of that content (Milliken & O’Donnell 2008). In addition, 
UGC websites must curate the content in an arrangement that lends itself to effective 
marketing; hence such sites must develop the ability to interpret uploaded content so that 
it can be properly classified at the outset (Villi, Moisander & Joy 2012). 
These infrastructural capabilities – namely, supporting a user base and curating 
the content – demand significant investment by the firm, in terms of both financing and 
time, if its UGC operation is to remain viable (Bharadwaj et al. 2013). An executive at a 
PPC site added this perspective: 
 
UGC is a problematic area that we did not want to pursue … it is not enough to 
just host any material, so you need to develop ability to understand the content … 
[PPC] is simpler and more focused. 
 
So in contrast to UGC sites, PPC sites operated on the relatively simple basis of 
paying original providers for content and then streaming it. Little or no investment is 
required to develop a user base, nor is any investment needed for content analysis or 
curation. Instead, PPC sites simply relay television or movie content that has been 
previously broadcast. In short, UGC and PPC sites rely on completely different sets of 
capabilities to support their business models. Prior research on the economics of Internet-
based entertainment services point to similar dynamics (see e.g. Sherman & Waterman, 
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2014). 
 
4.2 Regulatory change 
A quasi-exogenous event radically changed the competitive landscape just described. On 
31 January 2008, China's SARFT and Ministry of Information Industry (MII) introduced 
Regulations for Online Audio and Video Services, effective immediately.  
The new regulations named SARFT as the authority to administer, monitor, and 
regulate the industry's development. The regulations also required all online audio and 
video service providers to apply for an “Online Audio-Visual Broadcasting License”, 
with applicants agreeing to be governed by a standardized content-censoring system, 
receive funds only through approved sources, and to employ “standardized technology” 
(Bristow, 2010). 
Furthermore, broad powers were conferred or transferred to those regulatory 
bodies and also to the major (mainly state-owned) media producers. These entities were 
now authorized to police and censor content found on all Internet video sites, and they 
focused in particular on censoring UGC sites. For example, regulations required all UGC 
websites to delete any illegal or undesirable content immediately upon finding it, to keep 
a record of such actions, and to report all details thereof to the relevant authorities. Any 
violator was subject to having its operating license rescinded and paying a penalty of as 
much as RMB 30,000 (US$5000). 
The effects of these changes were profound. In essence, the new regulations 
severely curtailed the effectiveness of UGC as a business model. Hence sites began to 
focus on transitioning toward offering PPC. Interviewees referred often to how the 2008 
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regulatory changes affected the industry and forced them to adapt – and also to how 
sudden and unanticipated the change was. As recalled by the co-founder of a previously 
pure-UGC site: 
 
The 2008 regulations really changed the market … it isn’t so much that we were 
hosting illegal content … but the threat is scary. We hear tales of competitor sites 
being pulled off-line for hosting undesirable content … it really forced us to start 
thinking about alternative business models. 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of sites in terms of the two models – UGC and 
PPC – from 2006 to 2011. Time is represented in units that indicate the number of 
quarters from the firm’s earliest entry in the data set. For instance, time “1” (on the 
figure’s horizontal axis) corresponds to the third quarter of 2006. Starting in 2008 (at 
about time “7”) the distribution skews sharply toward PPC, in line with our expectations 
following the aforementioned regulatory change. Figure 1 also depicts the overall 
population density (i.e., number of active websites) over time. The graph reveals that, 
soon after the regulatory change, there was a massive shakeout in the industry before the 
number of new entrants began to pick up again. 
 
[[ INSERT Figure 1 about Here ]] 
 
We leverage this event as an exogenous source of variation toward the end of 
identifying two distinct commercialization environments. Because UGC as a business 
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model was severely hampered by central regulatory changes, such sites were under 
pressure to adapt by offering PPC. In other words, regulatory change provided an 
exogenous source of variation in incentives for the subset of UGC-only firms to alter 
their business model. Thus we take advantage of this watershed event not only to study 
the performance effects associated with a firm’s changing of its business model but also 
to explain how both adaptive and exaptive processes are involved in the industry’s 
development. 
 
4.3 Propositions regarding the role of exaptation 
Internet video firms were faced with clear choices after the regulatory change. For firms 
that had been practicing a pure-PPC business model, there was no ostensible reason to 
replace or even modify their existing business model. The UGC firms, however, faced 
distinct choices. They could plausibly choose to “stay the course” and continue offering 
only user-generated content. Alternatively, they could change their business model and 
begin to offer professionally produced content.  Although firms that began with an UGC 
business model were disadvantaged in the post–regulatory change environment, their 
initial foray into the UGC world may have allowed them to develop capabilities that they 
could later – though unexpectedly – leverage while moving away from their original 
business model.   
Casting the users of a video-sharing firm as complementary assets (Teece 1986; 
Gans & Stern 2003) allows us to develop the main prediction explored in our quantitative 
analysis. In the new PPC model, previously UGC sites were plunged into expensive 
battles to secure licensed content to stream.   By 2009, barely a year post-regulatory 
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change, YouKu was paying well over US$50m a year in licensing fees to secure PPC 
content from movie studios and TV stations (Montlake 2012).   Furthermore, much of 
this content could not be purchased on an exclusive basis, unless fees were increased 
dramatically.  This led to sites being distinctly undifferentiated as they offer highly 
similar content from site to site (Epstein, 2010).  Together with Chinese audiences’ 
unwillingness to pay for content, the video firms were in a bind as to figuring out ways to 
alleviate competitive pressure while staving off depleting cash. 
It became clear that firms needed to find a way to beat back the pressure while 
distinguishing themselves from the pack.  Around 2009, certain firms started transitioning 
from being pure repositories of licensed video content to producing the content.5  While 
they continued to license popular content from studios, they started investing in 
production capabilities and sponsoring artistes to develop content that they owned 
exclusive license to.  This was done for two main reasons.  First, it gave Internet video 
firms a potential way to distinguish themselves from the pack, as the self-produced 
content by construct will be exclusive.  Second, it also gave them a plausible means to 
not only reduce content acquisition costs by also to earn additional revenue as being the 
copyright holders; they can then license the content out to other firms should it prove 
popular.   The content produced was popularly referred to as Self Created Content (SCC), 
to distinguish it from normal PPC. 
Finding the creative talents to produce the content is not immediately 
straightforward.  However, UGC sites with their existing user base – which have been 
uploading content previously – may be able to leverage the amateur film makers as 
content producers as the firms switch towards producing content. In other words, users 
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could serve as complementary assets in the production of self-created content.  As 
recalled by the VP of operations at a major UGC site: 
 
We suddenly found ourselves with access to users who may have ability to create 
content, many [of whom] are part of the artistic young… we started engaging 
them to help us produce professional content that we can license. 
 
Nevertheless venturing into the world of content production also carries with it 
significant risk as the content needs to conform to SARFT rulings and regulations. 6 UGC 
sites however, should have had significance experience (and expertise) in dealing with 
SARFT.  The potential availability of users as content creators and the experience of 
dealing with censors, could serve as accidental yet unforeseen assets to enhance delivery 
of their new business model as producers of content. These potential capabilities and 
complementary assets, which derive from supporting and engaging users, lead one to 
hypothesize that entrants who successfully transitioned from a UGC to a PPC model will 
outperform those that offered only PPC – and so neither invested in users nor benefited 
from their value as assets.   
In sum: the exaptive process of repurposing assets (here, connections with users) 
for a new scenario (here, offering SCC) may explain the superior performance of initially 
UGC firms as they pivot to offering PPC. 
 
5 The role of exaptation: Quantitative data analysis 
To supplement the preceding qualitative review and propositions, we now undertake a 
range of empirical analyses that relate the choice of a business model to later firm 
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performance. The story presented here is a long and rich one that includes several 
industry shifts and changes.  The focus in this paper is on understanding the effect of 
strategic change on the firm’s subsequent performance.  Toward that end, we perform 
regressions in the contexts of firms that ultimately failed (by testing for across-firm 
variation in outcomes) and of firms’ interim performance as measured by number of 
visits (within-firm variation over time). 
 
5.1 Variables 
For our main explanatory variables, we coded the content offered by each firm. The 
content type we coded corresponded to what was offered in the quarter for which that 
type was observed in the cached webpage. Thus, quarter by quarter, firms offering 
content sourced exclusively from users (YouTube’s original model) were coded as 
“UGC” while firms offering content licensed from TV studios and other professional 
content providers (Hulu’s original model) were as “PPC”.7 
When analyzing firm performance, we examined both interim performance and 
firm survival. For our firm survival analysis, the primary outcome variable was coded 
from measures of failure. Going off-line for six or more consecutive months was coded as 
a Fail (i.e., not surviving). Websites that came back online after an extended period of 
dormancy were few in number: among all sites that went off-line for at least six months, 
less than 15% were eventually restored. Our results are robust to the exclusion of these 
sites.   
For our analysis of the interim performance of Internet-based start-ups, traditional 
financial measures (profitability, liquidity, cash flow, net worth, etc.) are usually not 
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available. So instead of using a more typical measure of financial performance (e.g., 
stock market returns), we use search volume for the focal website as measured by 
Baidu.com.  Search volume and other related measures of public interest have been used 
extensively as a proxy for users’ behavior, which ultimately determines firm performance 
(e.g. Carrière-Swallow & Labbé, 2013); our analysis uses the natural logarithm of the 
public interest index recorded by Baidu.com. Additional website metrics we collected 
from iResearch, which include the average time a viewer spends watching each video, 
will help in our robustness checks. 
Our models include controls for both initial conditions and subsequent 
competition between the websites. Regarding initial conditions, we exploited the 
unusually rich institutional environment of China to control for the ownership type of 
websites. Ownership type is acknowledged to be a key institutional factor because it 
indicates the avenues through which a government can exercise control, thus affecting the 
firm’s choice of competitive position and subsequent performance (Tan, Li & Xia 2007). 
Much like other sectors in China, the online video industry features ownership structures 
ranging from pure private start-ups to state-owned ventures. We use the State indicator 
variable to mark firms owned by the Chinese government. 
For firm characteristics we collected a list of venture capital (VC) investment 
events, which are publicly reported via China-specific investment media. In this way we 
created an indicator variable, Invest, that signifies whether or not the focal firm has any 
VC investors. Because most of these firms are private, additional firm-level data (e.g., 
employment count) were not publicly available. Finally, we also used our estimations to 
model competitive dynamics. Doing so required that we control for the number of active 
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websites in each time period – a measure of population density, which has been shown to 
correlate with firm failure (Carroll & Hannan 1989). This number is our Number of active 
firms variable. 
 
5.2 Estimation strategy 
We first estimate a discrete-time survival model for change in the post-regulatory period.8 
First, we define an indicator variable, UGC_initiallyi , to mark all firms that started with 
the UGC model. Finally, we use the indicator variable PPCi,t  to signify an offering of 
professionally produced content by firm i in quarter t; this variable is set to 1 if the firm 
offers PPC during that quarter of observation (and set to 0 otherwise). Our main variable 
of interest is the interaction between UGC_initiallyi  and PPCi,t . In other words, we seek 
to measure how firms offering PPC in the new competitive environment differ as a 
function of their initial strategy.  
Formally, we specify: 
 
ln[ pi,t / (1 − pi,t)] = α + β1(UGC_initiallyi) + β2(PPCi,t)  
+ β3(UGC_initiallyi)(PPCi,t) + γ(Xi,t). 
 
We repeat the same analysis for our interim performance measures. Because we use firm-
level fixed effects in our specifications, time-invariant factors such as UGC_initiallyi are 
absorbed. Formally, we specify: 
 
Yi,t = α + β1(PPCi,t) + β2(UGC_initiallyi)(PPCi,t) + Xi,t + Ω i + ε i,t . 
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Yet the choice of a business model, like any strategic decision, is generally 
endogenous; that characteristic makes it difficult to establish the direction of causality 
between performance and strategic choices. Although the dramatic shift in regulatory 
environment lends more confidence than usual to the supposition that strategic choices 
affect performance (and not vice versa), there remain justifiable concerns about the 
possibility of significant imbalances among the different groups of firms. To allay these 
concerns, we performed a “coarsened exact match” (CEM) procedure (Iacus, King & 
Porro 2012) to identify a control for each “treated” firm. In our setup, the treatment group 
consists of sites that started with a pure-UGC strategy but later (after the new regulations) 
adapted by offering PPC; the control group is made up of sites that started with a PPC 
strategy. We identified controls based on the following set of covariates: quarter of the 
firm’s entry, its ownership type, and the number of visits during the four quarters 
preceding the regulatory change in January 2008. We then coarsened the joint 
distributions of these covariates by deciles, a process that involved grouping firms in 
terms of their performance under the old regime (i.e., prior to the new regulations). Thus 
we were able to match 18 of the 22 treated firms. 
Following this exercise, our analysis focused on determining whether firms that 
retained features from their original, pure-UGC business model exhibited performance 
superior to firms that abandoned UGC upon offering PPC. In evaluating that hypothesis, 
we employ much the same specifications in performing regressions on subsamples of the 
data set. The results of these regressions will yield insight into the exaptive processes 
motivating this study. 
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All our variables are listed and described in Panel A of Table 1. Descriptive 
statistics of the variables – and the correlations among them – are given in Panel B. 
 
[[ INSERT Table 1 about Here ]] 
 
5.3 Regression results 
We start by looking at firms that began with the pure-UGC model and switched by 
adopting PPC. We wish to explore how this strategic adaptation is related to subsequent 
firm performance. First, we examine descriptive statistics of the strategic change 
by firms. 
 
[[ INSERT Table 2 about Here ]] 
 
Table 2 shows the morphology of firms after the regulatory change in 2008. In 
line with our expectations about the new environment, nearly 40% of all firms that started 
with a pure-UGC business model began to offer PPC after the regulatory change. In 
Table 3 we present discrete-time regression results concerning the strategic shifts in 
business models and how they relate to business failure. 
 
[[ INSERT Table 3 about Here ]] 
 
The results are interesting. Column (3) of the table shows that, on average, firms 
that began as pure-UGC sites yet later offered PPC were less likely to fail.  In other 
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words: sites whose pure-UGC model became disadvantaged by the new regulations were, 
if they subsequently offered PPC, more successful than other sites.  In column (4) we 
now consider the period after the regulatory change.  In column (4) we repeat the analysis 
but only for firms that entered the industry prior to the regulatory change; the results are 
similar, although we lose some statistical significance. 
In column (5) of Table 3 we now change our baseline firms to perform a stricter 
test.  We drop firms which stayed as pure UGC sites throughout from the sample.  In 
other words, the baseline firms are now those that both began and continued as PPC sites.  
This refinement is important as it helps us isolate the performance effect of the strategic 
transition, since these firms – targeted by the regulatory change – are expected to fail and 
hence may cause our results to be biased upwards. 9  As expected the magnitude on our 
coefficient of interest is smaller, yet it remains statistically significant.  In other words, 
sites which transition to offer PPC were more successful than sites that never offered 
anything but PPC.  
Finally in column (6), we repeat our analysis but now with the CEM sample. 
Despite considerable statistical power being lost because of the smaller sample, the data 
trends are similar to those observed previously. Firms that started with an initial UGC 
strategy – when matched in terms of entry timing, ownership, and previous quarters’ 
Interest levels – still fail at a substantially lower rate than do firms that started with an 
initial PPC strategy. According to our results, firms that began by using the subsequently 
disadvantaged UGC business model but that switched to offering PPC were associated 
with significant performance gains in comparison with firms that were not required to 
switch their business model. 
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[[ INSERT Table 4 about Here ]] 
 
We now turn to analyzing firms’ interim performance. The results of our firm 
fixed effects regressions, shown in Table 4, are in line with our earlier survival analysis. 
In column (2) of the table we see that, among PPC sites after the new regulations, those 
that began as pure-UGC sites and transitioned to also offering PPC enjoyed a 30% 
increase in (log) Interest relative to baseline sites; this result is significant at the 5% level. 
In column (3) we repeat the analysis but only for firms that entered the industry prior to 
the 2008 regulatory change; the results we obtain are similar. In column (4) the analysis 
was conducted using a conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression on the non-
logged Index. The results exhibit a consistent pattern: the coefficient for the 
UGC_initially × PPC interaction term remains consistently positive and significant. 
Column (5) repeats this analysis by dropping sites which stayed as pure UGC sites; 
Column (6) uses the CEM matched sample of firms. Just as with survival analysis, the 
same trends continue to hold.  
Overall, these regression results confirm what might seem to be a surprising 
phenomenon: firms that did not start with the PPC model end up outperforming firms that 
always offered PPC only. So in spite of being disadvantaged by regulatory changes, firms 
that adapted and changed their business model to the eventual dominant one do better 
than firms that never used anything but the dominant model. The analysis to follow will 
explicate the mechanisms driving this phenomenon. 
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5.4 Exaptation processes 
The results presented so far suggest that the successful evolution of certain firms – in 
offering PPC – was key to their performance gain. However, we should like to examine 
this case further to see if there were performance effects associated with exaptation 
processes. In other words, we wonder whether or not firms benefited from the capabilities 
derived from their initial foray into the ultimately disadvantaged UGC model. For this we 
distinguish between traditional PPC and self-created content (SCC). As discussed earlier 
in Section 4, the latter is content produced by amateur filmmakers and licensed by the 
firm for distribution. This content can be in the form of short films, drama series, or 
movies.10 
If the users carried over from developing a UGC platform are indeed 
complementary assets, then they should provide their associated firms with a competitive 
edge – by facilitating the development of SCC – over pure-PPC firms with no experience 
in developing and establishing access to a user community. We therefore coded for 
another binary indicator variable: SCC, which is set equal to 1 or 0 according as whether 
or not the focal firm produced licensed content through partnership with amateur 
filmmakers. We then examined the incidence of SCC via a linear probability specification 
while using as explanatory variables the firms’ strategic profiles (i.e., UGC_initially or 
not). We also provide alternative non-linear specifications using a logit.  Results are 
given in Table 5. 
 
[[ INSERT Table 5 about Here ]] 
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The results agree with our supposition. The coefficient for UGC_initially is both 
positive and significant, which suggests that firms that started off with engagement of 
users through offering of UGC are more likely to develop SCC than pure-PPC firms. 
These results hold also for the CEM sample, which is further evidence that – from the 
firm’s perspective – its UGC platform users are indeed complementary assets in the 
firms’ transition to producers of content.   
We repeat the same analysis for our interim performance measures, introducing 
SCC as a moderator variable.  For this exercise, in the interest of parsimony we consider 
only firms after pivoting to offering PPC after 2008 (together with those which had 
stayed in PPC mode). Formally, we specify: 
 
Yi,t = α + β1(SCCi,t) + β2(UGC_initiallyi)(SCCi,t) + Xi,t + Ω i + ε i,t . 
 
[[ INSERT Table 6 about Here ]] 
 
The results of our firm fixed effects regressions, shown in Table 6, exhibit a 
consistent pattern: the coefficient for the UGC_initially × SCC interaction term remains 
consistently positive and significant. Column (2) repeats this analysis using the matched 
sample of firms. The results in essence suggest that SCC is associated with superior 
performance, and firms that started with UGC seem to be benefitting more than those that 
had not.  Overall it lends support for our supposition that exaptive features left over from 
firms’ initial foray into the UGC world, had lent them capabilities and complementary 
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assets – users in this case – they could exploit in their transition towards producing 
content. 
Overall, the various regression results confirm what might seem to be a surprising 
phenomenon: firms that did not start with the PPC model end up outperforming firms that 
always offered PPC only. So in spite of being disadvantaged by regulatory changes, firms 
that adapted and changed their business model to the eventual dominant one do better 
than firms that never used anything but the dominant model. Further we present evidence 
that suggest that exaptive mechanisms drove the process.   
 
5.5 Robustness checks  
As a first robust check, we performed analysis using such alternative measures of 
performance as Number of pages viewed and Percentage share of total visits obtained 
from iResearch. The results remain similar for all models. Second, we had performed all 
analyses on only a subsample of the earliest entrants – those that entered before 2008. 
The main advantage of focusing on the earliest entrants is that doing so eliminates any 
concerns about the endogeneity of entry timing.  
Another possible challenge to our findings is if these sites were fundamentally 
different from each other and catered to different sets of viewers. That being the case 
would vitiate our empirical premise of a common entrepreneurial opportunity. Because 
analyzing just such a scenario is one of the paper’s key motivations, it is critical to 
establish that the websites in our data set attracted a common set of viewers – and thus 
can be viewed as having exploited a common entrepreneurial opportunity. 
For this purpose we obtained data from iResearch on the Average time spent on 
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a video. Chinese websites are tracked by iResearch using a representative sample group 
of consumers and their video consumption behavior, and the “average time spent” metric 
is measured in seconds. We use this metric as an alternative outcome variable in our 
regressions. An argument challenging our assumption would predict that the average time 
spent on a video is correlated with firms’ differing strategic profiles. The intuition behind 
that prediction is that the time spent on each video should differ if the video websites are, 
in fact, catering to different groups of viewers. In other words, the websites in question 
must be offering different kinds of videos. The time spent viewing videos is widely 
regarded as a reasonable (albeit imperfect) measure of the type of videos viewed (Artero 
2010; Kumar & Tomkins 2010). We fitted a fixed-effects ordinary least-squares (OLS) 
specification in this part of our analysis, the results of which are shown in Table 7. 
 
[[ INSERT Table 7 about Here ]] 
 
Column (1) of the table shows that the coefficient for UGC_only is insignificant, 
which indicates a lack of statistical evidence for arguing that the user profile for these 
sites differs from that for pure-PPC sites. The same trend prevails even when the sample 
is broken down in terms of the enacted regulatory changes (the Post2008 variable), as 
revealed in column (2). This finding lends weight to our empirical claim that the websites 
in question were all pursuing a common entrepreneurial opportunity when they entered 
the nascent industry. Thus these competing sites were likely using the same kind of 
content, which legitimizes our presumption of a common entrepreneurial opportunity. 
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6 Discussion 
Leveraging a newly assembled data set of all entrants to the Chinese Internet video 
industry between 2006 and 2011, we present both quantitative and qualitative evidence 
indicating that strong firm performance is more characteristic of entrants that switched to 
the eventual dominant strategy than of entrants that started with the dominant strategy. 
As a possible explanation of this puzzling empirical result, our evidence further suggests 
that a firm’s engagement with the user community prior to the occurrence of a regulatory 
shock (a quasi-exogenous shock) plays a unique and accidental role in their strategic 
switch – an exaptive process. We document how engagement of the user community by 
certain Internet video sites allowed them to build a sustainable performance advantage 
sufficient even to overcome the disadvantages entailed by a quasi-exogenous shock to the 
industry’s regulatory environment.  
The empirical observations on which our analysis is based accord with extant 
literature addressing the importance of complementary assets that underlie a technology’s 
commercialization (Teece, 1986). Scholars have emphasized the role of complementary 
assets and how their interaction with an environment’s “appropriability” affects the firm’s 
strategic choices (see e.g. Gans & Stern, 2003). The availability and consideration of 
these firm-level assets cohere with traditional explanations of industry evolutionary 
dynamics, yet they also enable a more dynamic approach to the entrepreneurial strategy 
process. When making core strategic commitments, a firm is normally most sensitive to 
the commercial environment. Nonetheless, its very next concern is typically how best to 
become adaptive in that environment by identifying and building (or modifying) the 
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firm’s unique and tailored capabilities, resources, and market positions that make its 
chosen strategy sustainable. 
Our paper also resonates with the increasing body of knowledge on effectuation 
theory as it relates to entrepreneurial decision-making.  In a fast-moving world that 
defines most nascent entrepreneurial environments, effectuation theory predicts that 
entrepreneurs are more likely to start with the means they have and assess for possible 
goals (see e.g. Sarasvathy, 2009).  Our results cohere with this line of thinking as the 
Internet video firm entrepreneurs adjust and switch in business models, arriving at an 
eventual winning model that is radically different from their original goals.   
The main limitation of this paper is the endogeneity of strategic choice, which 
means that the reported results should be interpreted cautiously. Even so, our work offers 
a methodological advancement beyond current literature by controlling for the underlying 
entrepreneurial opportunity and then using matched sets of firms to run a quasi-
experiment that helps clarify the effects of strategic adaptation. Our results point to the 
dynamic role of entrepreneurial strategy making. Some threads of the literature depict 
each firm as a largely unconnected and nonadaptive entity in that they focus either on 
initial strategies and products of firms (in their depictions of industry evolution) or on the 
entry and selective replacement of organizations. However, the results reported here 
suggest instead that entrepreneurial strategy must focus on how firms and managers can 
best respond to and then exploit environmental signals. 
The results of this paper have implications also for new directions of research that 
can take advantage of similar institutional barriers impeding the exploitation of original 
entrepreneurial ideas. This phenomenon is especially common in the digital age, where 
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business models can be rapidly copied and modified while leveraging the same 
technological platform. There exist clones of collective buying sites (Groupon clones 
such as Coupang.com), of social media websites (Twitter clones such as Weibo.com), 
and of social networking sites (Facebook clones such as RenRen.com). China is an 
especially rich setting for such study owing to the combination of enforced institutional 
barriers (e.g., the country’s Internet firewall) and “softer” barriers (e.g., its culture and 
language). Studying the development of clones of original ideas spawned elsewhere 
relieves the researcher from having to account for the confounding factors encountered in 
most traditional studies that seek to link strategy and performance (e.g., technological and 
founder effects). Hence our identification powers are increased, making it easier to isolate 
the causal effect of strategic variates. 
Like any study, ours has certain limitations. First, it offers evidence for exaptive 
processes yet examines just one industry context. As such, this paper is more of an 
instructive industry case study than a strong test of our theories. Second, the data do not 
provide a full picture of the firms’ time-variant organizational capabilities and 
resources – a consequence of the limitations inherent to this industry setting. Future work 
could devise clearer measures of technical capabilities and resources.  Nevertheless, as 
one of the first studies in exaptation that have departed from the realms of technology 
towards a more generalized entrepreneurial setting, we see this as a necessary 
compromise to establish a new research agenda of exaptation in entrepreneurship, with 
hope that future research might advance it further. 
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Figure 1 Chinese Internet video firms: Strategy density (percentage using a particular business model) – and patterns of 
entry and exit – during 19 consecutive quarters beginning July 2006 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
UGC only firms Number of firms
Number of Firms Percentage of Firms 
 40 
Table 1 Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables, and their correlation 
Panel A Definition of variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Strategic variables  
UGC_only Dummy variable set to 1 if the firm offers UGC only (set to 0 otherwise) Internet Wayback Machine 
PPC_only Dummy variable set to 1 if the firm offers PPC only Internet Wayback Machine 
Mixed Dummy variable set to 1 if the firm offers both UGC and PPC Internet Wayback Machine 
PPC Dummy variable set to 1 if the firm offers PPC  
UGC_initially Dummy variable set to 1 if the firm started operations with a pure-UGC 
business model 
Internet Wayback Machine 
   
Firm characteristics  
Post2008 Dummy variable set to1 if the firm is operating subsequent to the 
regulatory change in 2008 
Internet Wayback Machine 
State Dummy variable set to 1 if the firm is owned by either state or provincial 
government 
SARFT, Internet Wayback 
Machine 
Invest Dummy variable set to 1 if either a venture capital or private equity 
company invested in the firm 
Investment news sites 
Age Number of quarters the firm has been active since its founding Internet Wayback Machine 
Quarter of entry Quarter in which the firm first entered industry Internet Wayback Machine 
   
Other controls   
Number of active 
firms 
Number of firms active in the industry during the focal quarter Internet Wayback Machine 
Quarter of 
observation 
Quarter in which the firm is observed Internet Wayback Machine 
   
Performance variables  
Fail Dummy variable set to 1 if the firm goes off-line for more than six 
consecutive months 
Internet Wayback Machine 
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Interest  Public Interest index recorded by Baidu Index  Baidu Index 
SCC Dummy variable set to 1 if the firm offers SCC Internet Wayback Machine 
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Panel B Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
PPC 752 0.78 0.42 0 1 
UGC_initially 752 0.42 0.49 0 1 
State 752 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Invest 752 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Age (L) 752 1.95 0.77 0 2.94 
Number of active firms (L) 752 4.41 0.15 4.11 4.57 
Quarter of observation 752 12.34 3.80 7 19 
Quarter of entry 752 4.64 4.57 1 19 
Fail 752 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Interest 752 1.73 0.78 0.62 4.57 
SCC 752 0.082 0.27 0 1 
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PPC 
UGC_initia
lly 
State Invest Age (L) 
Number of 
active 
firms (L) 
Quarter of 
observatio
n 
Quarter 
of entry 
Fail 
Interest 
(L) 
SCC 
PPC 1 
          
UGC_initially 0.32 1          
State 0.14 −0.20 1 
        
Invest 0.10 0.24 −0.16 1 
       
Age (L) 0.06 0.24 0.09 0.21 1 
      
Number of 
active firms 
(L) 
−0.26 −0.00 −0.07 −0.17 −0.03 1 
     
Quarter of 
observation 
0.40 −0.05 0.06 0.16 0.29 −0.49 1 
    
Quarter of 
entry 
0.21 −0.31 −0.07 −0.13 −0.53 −0.11 0.34 1 
   
Fail −0.39 0.13 −0.05 −0.19 0.05 0.05 −0.07 −0.11 1 
  
Interest (L) 0.11 −0.01 −0.05 0.11 0.00 −0.02 0.01 0.01 −0.18 1 
 
SCC 0.11 0.24 0.00 0.15 0.25 −0.28 0.37 −0.07 −0.08 0.12 1 
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Table 2 Pattern of strategic adaptation after regulatory change 
as a function of the firm’s initial strategy choice 
 Initial business plan 
Post-2008 business plan UGC PPC 
Offer PPC   39.6% 100% 
Offer only UGC   60.4%     0% 
 
Note: The key statistic in this table is that, among firms starting with a pure-UGC 
strategy and still operating after the January 2008 regulatory changes, nearly four 
in ten eventually adapted by offering PPC. 
 
 
  
 45 
Table 3 Discrete-time estimation results for strategic adaptation and failure of 
Chinese Internet video firms 
 Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
Pre-2008 
entry 
Drop 
UGC-
only 
CEM 
sample 
(4) (5) (6) 
UGC_initially 
 
-1.475** 0.575 0.490 -0.311 1.189 
  
(0.476) (0.576) (0.630) (0.614) (0.829) 
PPC 
 
-3.366*** -1.353** -1.431** -1.176* -1.073** 
  
(0.534) (0.539) (0.591) (0.526) (0.549) 
UGC_initially X PPC 
  
-2.420** -2.455** -1.512* -1.622* 
   
(0.795) (0.849) (0.838) (0.981) 
       
Control Variables 
      
State -0.887* -0.604 -0.650 -0.377 -0.377 -0.406 
 
(0.373) (0.394) (0.398) (0.450) (0.450) (0.541) 
Invest -1.930*** -1.540*** -1.527*** -1.490*** -1.132** -0.553 
 
(0.466) (0.454) (0.454) (0.495) (0.466) (0.510) 
Number of firms (L) 0.117 0.189 0.0790 0.814 0.0221 0.175 
 
(0.830) (0.791) (0.796) (0.893) (0.973) (0.239) 
Age (L) -0.0831 0.134 0.0930 0.0151 0.257 -0.175 
 
(0.395) (0.433) (0.418) (0.494) (0.587) (0.669) 
Quarter of observation 0.0239 0.141** 0.149** 0.199*** 0.0929 0.0721 
 
(0.0636) (0.0627) (0.0638) (0.0755) (0.0841) (0.111) 
Quarter of entry -0.104 -0.0660 -0.0757 -0.0128 0.0146 -0.131 
 
(0.0777) (0.0773) (0.0764) (0.0926) (0.103) (0.120) 
Interest (L) -0.565*** -0.449*** -0.471*** -0.377*** -0.573** -0.882*** 
 
(0.172) (0.172) (0.175) (0.170) (0.219) (0.265) 
Constant -0.141 0.262 -1.171 -5.100 -0.867 9.184 
 (3.903) (3.863) (3.928) (4.469) (4.891) (6.930) 
       
Observations 752 752 752 653 566 408 
Χ 2 [df] 45.7 [7] 79.2 [9] 80.1[10] 78.9 [10] 46.2[10] 44.03 [10] 
Log-likelihood –372.1 -321.3 –318.4 -347.1 -233.9 -172.0 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm. CEM = coarsened exact 
match; (L) = logged. 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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Table 4 Firm fixed-effects estimation results for the strategic adaptation of Chinese Internet video firms subsequent to 
regulatory change 
    Dependent variable 
 
Interest 
(L) 
Interest (L) 
Interest (L) Interest (L)  Interest (L) Interest (L) 
 
[pre-2008 
entry] 
[pre-2008 
entry] 
[pre-2008 
entry, drop 
UGC-only 
sites] 
[pre-2008 entry, 
CEM sample 
 
       
 Model: OLS OLS OLS N.B. OLS OLS 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PPC   0.0821 0.0901 1.0931 0.0885 0.186 
 
  
(0.0707) (0.0760) (0.204) (0.0760) (0.229) 
 UGC_initially 
 
0.348** 0.337** 1.739** 0.331** 0.114* 
  × PPC 
 
(0.116) (0.120) (0.369) (0.124) (0.0572) 
 
       
 Control variables 
      
 State 0.128* 0.0113 0.0128 1.530 0.0384 -0.176 
 
 
(0.0699) (0.0773) (0.0796) (20.846) (0.0861) (0.311) 
 Invest 0.297*** 0.280*** 0.297*** 1.434** 0.299*** 0.0355 
 
 
(0.0792) (0.0848) (0.0857) (0.230) (0.0879) (0.0330) 
 Number of firms (L) 1.458** 1.441** 1.334** 4.041* 1.298** 0.0161 
 
 
(0.483) (0.535) (0.0593) (2.458) (0.648) (0.125) 
 Age (L) -0.0846 -0.0524 -0.0851 0.864 -0.109 -0.00517 
 
 
(0.103) (0.0989) (0.0890) (0.0790) (0.0936) (0.0553) 
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Constant -4.520** -4.501* -4.004 0.0337 -3.830 0.483 
  (2.142) (2.373) (2.642) (0.0910) (0.229) (0.578) 
       
 Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Observations 752 752 653 639 566 408 
 Number of firms 137 137 100 86 72 56 
 Adjusted R-square 0.01 0.02 0.05 N.A. 0.033 0.05 
  
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm; IRR reported for column (4); CEM = coarsened exact match; (L) = logged; 
N.A. = not applicable; N.B. = negative binomial. 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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Table 5 Incidence of self-created content (SCC) in firms’ strategic profiles 
     
                          
Model OLS OLS      
 
Logit 
 
Logit 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UGC_initially  0.129*** 
(0.0338) 
0.117** 2.627*** 2.200** 
 (0.0421) (1.007) (0.806) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 566 408 343 274 
Number of firms 72 56 61 52 
Adjusted R-square 0.40 0.25 NA NA 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is SCC, and the reference group consists of firms that started as 
pure PPC. Robust standard errors (given in parentheses) are clustered by firm. Column (2) and (4) 
are based on the CEM sample. 
**p < 0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Table 6  Firm fixed-effects estimation results for the performance of firms post 
regulatory change and pivot 
   
Variable (1) (2) 
SCC 0.102 
(0.137) 
-0.0508 
(0.0830) 
   
UGC_initially x SCC 0.273* 
(0.150) 
0.204** 
 (0.0826) 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 491 372 
Number of firms 68 56 
Adjusted R-square 0.03 0.07 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is Interest (logged), and the 
reference group consists of firms that started as pure PPC. Robust 
standard errors (given in parentheses) are clustered by firm. 
Column (2) is based on the CEM sample. 
*p<0.1, **p < 0.05 
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Table 7 Fixed effects estimation results of Time Spent on Videos segmented by 
business models 
 
 (1) (2) 
   [Post 2008] 
   
UGC_only -0.278 -0.0563 
 (0.227) (0.215) 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1128 752 
Number of firms 146 137 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.06 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is Average time spent per video (logged);  
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parenthesis.   
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.     
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1 China’s Internet censorship policy is extensive and spans a wide variety of laws and 
administrative regulations. Scholars have estimated that at least 18,000 websites are 
blocked from within mainland China and the number is always growing (Edelman & 
Zittrain 2005). The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) defends this 
censoring by claiming that, within its own borders, the country has the right to govern the 
Internet according to its own rules. (Bristow, 2010). 
2 See, for example, “Chinese Borrowing,” The Economist, 7 May 2009. 
3 In this paper, “UGC” and “PPC” are used with reference both to the business model and 
to the type of content; clarification will be provided where confusion might otherwise 
ensue. 
4  Both business models in that period utilized the same Adobe Flash technological 
platform. Alternative technological platforms have emerged since the period that we 
analyze, in particular the growth of HTML5 (and, to a much lesser degree, of 
QuickTime). 
5 Similar dynamics have also been observed in the US market.  YouTube runs a fairly 
similar program called YouTube Partners where they sponsor selected YouTube users to 
produce content that they own copyrights to.  Other examples include Netflix and 
Amazon (Prime), which all produce content now after previously existing as mere replay 
sites. 
6 There are numerous anecdotes on self-produced content running afoul of the regulators.  
For example, the short TV drama Love Finally produced by Ku6.com was reportedly 
cited by the authorities for portrayal of adult sexuality while being self-classified as a 
“youth drama”.   
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7 Further details on the coding are documented in Appendix A (available online). 
8 We acknowledge that these firms may be regarded as multi-sided platforms (as in 
Boudreau, 2010) especially those of the UGC type. Although this paper does not debate 
the merits of particular platform-related strategies, our estimation approach is similar to 
that used by many current studies on such strategies. One notable difference is that, in the 
baseline regressions, we do not directly model network effects in terms of user growth 
dynamics (Boudreau, 2012). Yet this difference should not present any problems because 
our procedure, in effect, matches treated firms with a set of control firms that are nearly 
balanced in terms of performance (number of users). Hence in our estimations all treated 
firms have about the same number of users before the regulatory change, which 
eliminates most noise arising from specific network effects. 
9 Our initial set of analyses presents a detailed look at the failure rates of firms that 
persisted in using a pure-UGC model. In the interest of parsimony, we do not present 
these results in the main paper but instead collect them in Appendix B (available online). 
The results confirm that firms retaining their pure-UGC model after the regulatory 
change are associated with performance declines; this finding supports our assumption 
that, as a business model, UGC was indeed disadvantaged by the new regulations. 
10 We have observed similar dynamics in the US and international markets recently.  
YouTube, Vimeo and other Internet video firms have been engaging users to create 
professional, licensed content. 
